Critical decisions and constitutional rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0492-3MaRDI QIDQ647553zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Toke S. Aidt, Francesco Giovannoni

Publication date 23 November 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0523.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
• Fiscal constitutions
• Tax rules
• Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation

Cites work

• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Dividing resources by flexible majority rules
• Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
• Endogenous Political Institutions
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Private provision of discrete public goods
• Storable votes
• Voting on Majority Rules

Cited in

(5)

• Fiscal constitutions
• In the beginning there were n agents: founding and amending a constitution
• Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Information sharing in democratic mechanisms

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