Dividing resources by flexible majority rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-004-0314-6MaRDI QIDQ1762861zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach

Publication date 11 February 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-004-0314-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(4)

• Voting with public information
• Implementing a surplus division rule
• Critical decisions and constitutional rules
• Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour

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