Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.08.004zbMath1400.91153OpenAlexW3122799700WikidataQ60501372 ScholiaQ60501372MaRDI QIDQ2402066

Antonio Merlo, Hülya Eraslan

Publication date: 6 September 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/14-003.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

inequalityvoting rulesmultilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining ⋮ Equality in legislative bargaining

Cites Work

• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
• The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn model with risk‐averse players

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