The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
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Publication:3428547
DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2006.00701.XzbMATH Open1138.91596OpenAlexW2105380711MaRDI QIDQ3428547FDOQ3428547
Authors: B. Douglas Bernheim, Antonio Rangel, Luis Rayo 
Publication date: 27 March 2007
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00701.x
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- Bargaining over the budget
- Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game
- Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
- Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
- A foundation for strategic agenda voting
- Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses
- Corruption and bicameral reforms
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism
- Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting
- Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
- Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
- Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- The Condorcet paradox revisited
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