Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.009zbMath1296.91084OpenAlexW1965566079MaRDI QIDQ405532

Ronny Razin, Gilat Levy

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic decision makinglobbyinginfluence functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (2)

Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions ⋮ Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose

Cites Work

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• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Gradualism and Irreversibility

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