Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2811zbMath1034.91031OpenAlexW3123682431WikidataQ60501413 ScholiaQ60501413MaRDI QIDQ1599825

Antonio Merlo, Hülya Eraslan

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4cf9a5a41f34120d5da60a81ab0a947a2dc4ad4d

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingvoting rulesstochastic gamenon-cooperative

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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