Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105649zbMATH Open1520.91193OpenAlexW4375952598MaRDI QIDQ6166475FDOQ6166475

Authors: Zizhen Ma 

Publication date: 6 July 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105649

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zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargainingreputational bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Pivots versus signals in elections
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Bargaining and Reputation
• On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties
• Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
• Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
• An \(N\)-person war of attrition with the possibility of a noncompromising type

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