Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
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Publication:854935
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.04.003zbMATH Open1141.91388OpenAlexW3124053878MaRDI QIDQ854935FDOQ854935
Authors: S. Nageeb M. Ali 
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.003
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Waiting to Persuade
- The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
- Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
Cited In (11)
- Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
- Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
- Optimal stalling when bargaining
- Collective hold‐up
- Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
- Delay in a bargaining game with contracts
- Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
- Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information
- Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
- Optimism and bargaining inefficiency
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
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