Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.04.003MaRDI QIDQ854935zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors S. Nageeb M. Ali

Publication date 7 December 2006

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

delayoptimismmultilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Optimism and bargaining inefficiency
• Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Waiting to Persuade
• Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
• Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
• Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Waiting to Persuade

Cited in

(13)

• Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
• Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
• Delay in a bargaining game with contracts
• Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
• Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining
• Optimal stalling when bargaining
• Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Collective hold‐up
• Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
• Optimism and bargaining inefficiency
• Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

This page was built for publication: Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q854935)