Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
- Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
- Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
- The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
- Waiting to Persuade
Cited in
(13)- Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
- Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
- Delay in a bargaining game with contracts
- Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
- Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining
- Optimal stalling when bargaining
- Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Collective hold‐up
- Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
- Optimism and bargaining inefficiency
- Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
- Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
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