Waiting to Persuade
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Publication:4469709
DOI10.1162/003355304772839579zbMATH Open1096.91002OpenAlexW1520897627MaRDI QIDQ4469709FDOQ4469709
Authors: Muhamet Yildiz
Publication date: 18 June 2004
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839579
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Cited In (21)
- Delay to deal: bargaining with indivisibility and round-dependent transfer
- Bargaining under strategic uncertainty: the role of second-order optimism
- Games with possibly naive present-biased players
- Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining
- Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
- No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining
- An optimistic search equilibrium
- Optimal stalling when bargaining
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- Slow persuasion
- Wait-freedom with advice
- Wait-freedom with advice
- Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements?
- Collective hold‐up
- Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
- Bargaining in small dynamic markets
- Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
- Resisting persuasion
- Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games
- Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Optimism and bargaining inefficiency
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