Waiting to Persuade

DOI10.1162/003355304772839579zbMath1096.91002OpenAlexW1520897627MaRDI QIDQ4469709

Muhamet Yildiz

Publication date: 18 June 2004

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839579

zbMATH Keywords

learningequilibriumsequential bargaining model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (11)

Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors ⋮ Optimal stalling when bargaining ⋮ Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases ⋮ Collective hold‐up ⋮ Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining ⋮ Bargaining in small dynamic markets ⋮ Games with possibly naive present-biased players ⋮ Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments ⋮ Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games ⋮ No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining ⋮ An optimistic search equilibrium

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