Waiting to Persuade

DOI10.1162/003355304772839579MaRDI QIDQ4469709zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Muhamet Yildiz

Publication date 18 June 2004

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839579

zbMATH Keywords

learningequilibriumsequential bargaining model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited in

(21)

• Delay to deal: bargaining with indivisibility and round-dependent transfer
• Bargaining under strategic uncertainty: the role of second-order optimism
• Games with possibly naive present-biased players
• Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining
• Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
• No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining
• An optimistic search equilibrium
• Optimal stalling when bargaining
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Slow persuasion
• Wait-freedom with advice
• Wait-freedom with advice
• Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements?
• Collective hold‐up
• Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
• Bargaining in small dynamic markets
• Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
• Resisting persuasion
• Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games
• Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Optimism and bargaining inefficiency

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