Collective hold‐up

DOI10.3982/TE4632MaRDI QIDQ6076918zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Matias Iaryczower, Santiago Oliveros

Publication date 17 October 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4632

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingcontracting externalitiesdelaypolitical economyvote buying

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Principal-agent models (91B43) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
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• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining
• Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
• Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining
• Search theory: the 2010 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Sequential vote buying
• Transparency, complementarity and holdout
• Unbundling polarization
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Waiting to Persuade
• Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
• Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective

Cited in

(2)

• Group bargaining: a model of international treaty ratification
• Strategyproof and budget-balanced mechanisms for assembly

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