Collective hold‐up - MaRDI portal

Cites Work

Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining
Transparency, complementarity and holdout
Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
A theory of endogenous coalition structures
Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
Sequential vote buying
A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
Search Theory: The 2010 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
Contracting with Externalities
Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
Waiting to Persuade
A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
Unbundling Polarization
A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining

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