Collective hold‐up
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Publication:6076918
DOI10.3982/te4632MaRDI QIDQ6076918
Santiago Oliveros, Matias Iaryczower
Publication date: 17 October 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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