Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.003zbMath1142.91458OpenAlexW2163932849MaRDI QIDQ860348

Debraj Ray, Garance Genicot

Publication date: 9 January 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4506439000000000235.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

exploitationdelayscoordination gamebilateral contractingmultilateral externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items

The timing of contracting with externalities ⋮ Partially cooperative games ⋮ Collective hold‐up ⋮ Breakdown in multilateral negotiations ⋮ The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining ⋮ Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales ⋮ On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations ⋮ Optimal Nonlinear Pricing in Social Networks Under Asymmetric Network Information ⋮ Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published? ⋮ Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure ⋮ Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities ⋮ Contracting with externalities and outside options ⋮ Group targeting under networked synergies ⋮ Sequential vote buying

Cites Work

• Perfect competition, the profit criterion, and the organization of economic activity
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Contracting with Externalities
• Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
• Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
• Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities