The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining

DOI10.1007/S00182-018-00657-XzbMATH Open1411.91041OpenAlexW2906003897WikidataQ128613630 ScholiaQ128613630MaRDI QIDQ2424239FDOQ2424239

Authors: Suchan Chae, Seho Kim 

Publication date: 24 June 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-00657-x

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zbMATH Keywords

sequential bargainingtax incidenceanchored bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• The bargaining problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• An \(N\)-person pure bargaining game
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
• Multilateral Bargaining
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Time Preference
• Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
• The unique perfect equilibrium of an \(n\)-person bargaining game
• Gambling reputation: repeated bargaining with outside options
• Tax incidence with bargaining

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