A unique solution to n-person sequential bargaining
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Publication:1189696
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90013-IzbMATH Open0773.90096MaRDI QIDQ1189696FDOQ1189696
Authors: Geir B. Asheim
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
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- The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
- Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
- Non-cooperative bargaining of \(N \geq 3\) players
- The unique perfect equilibrium of an \(n\)-person bargaining game
- A unique solution to \(n\)-person sequential bargaining
Cited In (24)
- AN n-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME
- Bargaining with a ruler
- Sequential share bargaining
- Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution
- A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol
- Non-cooperative bargaining of \(N \geq 3\) players
- An alternative proof of uniqueness in non-cooperative bargaining
- Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games
- Acquisition war-gaming technique for acquiring future complex systems: modeling and simulation results for cost plus incentive fee contract
- Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining: experimental evidence from Germany and China
- A unique solution to \(n\)-person sequential bargaining
- Uniqueness in random-proposer multilateral bargaining
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem
- Equilibria in sequential bargaining games as solutions to systems of equations
- A note on bargaining over a finite number of feasible agreements
- Payoffs in generalized sequential bargaining games
- Pledge-and-review bargaining
- Optimistic stability in games of perfect information
- A note on three-player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings
- Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining
- The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
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