Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem

DOI10.1007/s11238-021-09838-9zbMath1497.91141OpenAlexW3194799597MaRDI QIDQ2157827

Kazuo Yamaguchi

Publication date: 22 July 2022

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09838-9

zbMATH Keywords

facility locationunanimity rulespatial bargaininglexicographic maximin utility criterionrectilinear distance spacerejecter-becomes-proposer protocol

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

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