Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.01.006MaRDI QIDQ719876zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Cardona, Clara Ponsatí

Publication date 12 October 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalitysingle-peaked preferencesquota rulesone-dimensional bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
• Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• On 64%-Majority Rule
• One-dimensional bargaining
• The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model

Cited in

(13)

• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax
• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
• A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
• Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol
• Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem
• Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model
• THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIR
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
• A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
• The Condorcet paradox revisited

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