Bargaining one-dimensional social choices

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.001zbMath1132.91320OpenAlexW2123999762MaRDI QIDQ2469862

Clara Ponsatí, Daniel Cardona

Publication date: 11 February 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57445

zbMATH Keywords

votingbargainingsingle-peaked preferencesqualified majorityone-dimensional policiespublic good location

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (12)

A bargaining model of endogenous procedures ⋮ One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities ⋮ Bargaining under monotonicity constraints ⋮ Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem ⋮ Sequential share bargaining ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members ⋮ One-dimensional bargaining ⋮ On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria ⋮ Outcomes of bargaining and planning in single facility location problems ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules ⋮ Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• Order independent equilibria
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Bargaining and Value

This page was built for publication: Bargaining one-dimensional social choices