Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
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Publication:2469862
Recommendations
- One-dimensional bargaining
- Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives
- Bargaining mechanisms for one-way games
- Rational choice and two-person bargaining solutions
- Bargaining solutions as social compromises
- One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
- Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives
- Social choice and bargaining perspectives on distributive justice
- One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
- Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3775297 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- Bargaining and Value
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
- Order independent equilibria
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
Cited in
(16)- One-dimensional bargaining
- Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
- Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem
- Outcomes of bargaining and planning in single facility location problems
- Sequential share bargaining
- Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
- Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax
- One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
- On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
- Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Bargaining under monotonicity constraints
- A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
- Location of an undesirable facility on a network: a bargaining approach
- A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
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