Sequential share bargaining

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0286-6zbMath1274.91225MaRDI QIDQ422357

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski

Publication date: 16 May 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0286-6

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic games; subgame perfect equilibrium; noncooperative bargaining; unanimous agreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A25: Dynamic games

Related Items

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems, Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining, Self-interest and equity concerns: a behavioural allocation rule for operational problems

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