Sequential share bargaining

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0286-6MaRDI QIDQ422357zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski

Publication date 16 May 2012

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0286-6

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamessubgame perfect equilibriumnoncooperative bargainingunanimous agreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Dynamic games (91A25)

Recommendations

• A unique solution to \(n\)-person sequential bargaining
• Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Non-cooperative bargaining of N 3 players
• AN n-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099354 (Why is no real title available?)
• An \(N\)-person pure bargaining game
• Another \(n\)-person bargaining game with a unique perfect equilibrium
• Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Equilibria in sequential bargaining games as solutions to systems of equations
• Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution
• Multilateral Bargaining
• Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers
• Non-cooperative bargaining of N 3 players
• One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems
• The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.

Cited in

(10)

• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements
• Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol
• AN n-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME
• Decentralized one-to-many bargaining
• Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
• Self-interest and equity concerns: a behavioural allocation rule for operational problems
• Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining
• A unique solution to \(n\)-person sequential bargaining
• The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining

This page was built for publication: Sequential share bargaining

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q422357)