The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00035-9MaRDI QIDQ1566511zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors H. Imai, Hannu Salonen

Publication date 14 August 2001

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00035-9

zbMATH Keywords

perfect equilibriumrepresentative Nash solutiontwo sided bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Review text

The authors consider the class of bargaining games where the interests of the participants of bargaining are diametrically opposite and the issue on the bargaining table is represented by a one dimensional set. An \(n\) person bargaining situation is two sided when the participants of bargaining are divided in two groups and the preferences are monotonically increasing in one group and monotonically decreasing in the other group. A solution called the representative Nash solution is introduced and axiomatized. A strategic bargaining model is constructed such that the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome corresponds to the representative Nash solution.

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Cited in

(11)

• Replication invariance of bargaining solutions
• A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution
• On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols
• Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax
• Solution concept for a two person bargaining problem with unknown parameters
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• Sequential share bargaining
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784410 (Why is no real title available?)
• One-dimensional bargaining
• One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities

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