Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry

DOI10.2307/1912322MaRDI QIDQ3740501zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jan Svejnar

Publication date 1986

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1912322

zbMATH Keywords

labor marketbargaining powerwage determinationfear of disagreementunion-nonunion wage differentials

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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• Wage Bargaining, Inventories, and Union Legislation
• Insiders and outsiders in labour market models
• Fear of ruin
• Non-nested tests of efficient bargain and labour demand models
• The relative profitability of Nash bargaining on the labour demand curve or the contract curve
• The codetermined firm in oligopoly
• Wage dispersion within firms and collective bargaining in Spain
• A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict: The genesis of bargaining power
• Bargaining in a multi-echelon supply chain with power structure: KS solution vs. Nash solution
• Endogenous wage bargaining institutions in oligopolistic sectors
• An axiomatization of the weighted NTU value
• Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: a coopetitive-game analysis
• Efficient bargaining with underutilization of labor
• The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems
• Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence
• Wage discrimination and antidiscrimination policy in unionized industries
• Unionized oligopoly, labor-management cooperation, and international competitiveness
• A note on the risk dominance of the Nash demand game
• Labor Union Objectives and Collective Bargaining

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