Bargaining in a multi-echelon supply chain with power structure: KS solution vs. Nash solution
DOI10.3934/JIMO.2020172zbMATH Open1499.90039OpenAlexW3112548265MaRDI QIDQ2076465FDOQ2076465
Authors: Feimin Zhong, Jinxing Xie, Yuwei Shen
Publication date: 16 February 2022
Published in: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2020172
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pricingmulti-echelon supply chainnegotiationbargaining powergeneralized KS solutiongeneralized Nash solution
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)
Cites Work
- The bargaining problem
- Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions
- The price of fairness
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
- Bargaining chains
- Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games.
- Multi-item deteriorating two-echelon inventory model with price- and stock-dependent demand: a trade-credit policy
- The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game
- Bargaining equilibrium in a two-echelon supply chain with a capital-constrained retailer
- Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry
- Quantifying supply chain ineffectiveness under uncoordinated pricing decisions
- Solutions for bargaining games with incomplete information: general type space and action space
- On efficiency of multistage channel with bargaining over wholesale prices
- Deteriorating inventory with preservation technology under price- and stock-sensitive demand
- Technical Note—Local Bargaining and Supply Chain Instability
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