Bargaining in a multi-echelon supply chain with power structure: KS solution vs. Nash solution
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2076465
Recommendations
- On the non-symmetric Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solutions
- On efficiency of multistage channel with bargaining over wholesale prices
- A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem
- Bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty
- The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Wage Negotiations
Cites work
- A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
- Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry
- Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games.
- Bargaining chains
- Bargaining equilibrium in a two-echelon supply chain with a capital-constrained retailer
- Deteriorating inventory with preservation technology under price- and stock-sensitive demand
- Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions
- Multi-item deteriorating two-echelon inventory model with price- and stock-dependent demand: a trade-credit policy
- On efficiency of multistage channel with bargaining over wholesale prices
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Quantifying supply chain ineffectiveness under uncoordinated pricing decisions
- Solutions for bargaining games with incomplete information: general type space and action space
- Technical Note—Local Bargaining and Supply Chain Instability
- The bargaining problem
- The price of fairness
- The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game
Cited in
(1)
This page was built for publication: Bargaining in a multi-echelon supply chain with power structure: KS solution vs. Nash solution
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2076465)