A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem

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Publication:3117740

DOI10.1287/mnsc.1080.0880zbMath1232.91322OpenAlexW3125468234MaRDI QIDQ3117740

Mahesh Nagarajan, Yehuda Bassok

Publication date: 29 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0880




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