The more supply chain control power, the better? A comparison among four kinds of cooperation models
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Publication:1665256
DOI10.1155/2015/290912zbMath1394.90105OpenAlexW2104509040WikidataQ59117882 ScholiaQ59117882MaRDI QIDQ1665256
Shuqing Wang, Donglei Zhu, Weihua Liu
Publication date: 27 August 2018
Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/290912
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Cites Work
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