The more supply chain control power, the better? A comparison among four kinds of cooperation models

DOI10.1155/2015/290912zbMath1394.90105OpenAlexW2104509040WikidataQ59117882 ScholiaQ59117882MaRDI QIDQ1665256

Shuqing Wang, Donglei Zhu, Weihua Liu

Publication date: 27 August 2018

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/290912

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)

Related Items

Investigating a green supply chain with product recycling under retailer's fairness behavior

Cites Work

• Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering
• Managing inventories in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain
• Research on coordination mechanism in three-level green supply chain under non-cooperative game
• A coordinating contract for transshipment in a two-company supply chain
• A Stackelberg game and its improvement in a VMI system with a manufacturing vendor
• Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• Alliance or no alliance -- bargaining power in competing reverse supply chains
• Least squares estimation in a simple random coefficient autoregressive model
• The risk and information sharing of application services supply chain
• Non-cooperative games
• A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem