Alliance or no alliance -- bargaining power in competing reverse supply chains
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Publication:2256141
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2013.09.021zbMath1305.91161OpenAlexW2040190436MaRDI QIDQ2256141
Publication date: 19 February 2015
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.09.021
Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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- Learning dynamics in social dilemmas
- Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models with Product Remanufacturing
- Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
- A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem
- A Model of Promotional Competition in Oligopoly
- Upstream pollution, downstream waste disposal, and the design of comprehensive environmental policies
- Contract design and bargaining power
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