Alliance or no alliance -- bargaining power in competing reverse supply chains
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5200101 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem
- A Model of Promotional Competition in Oligopoly
- A coordinated reverse logistics system for regional management of multi-source hazardous wastes
- Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing
- Contract design and bargaining power
- Learning dynamics in social dilemmas
- Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations
- Upstream pollution, downstream waste disposal, and the design of comprehensive environmental policies
Cited in
(10)- Bargaining power choices with moral hazard in a supply chain
- The optimal reverse channel choice under supply chain competition
- Game modes and investment cost locations in radio-frequency identification (RFID) adoption
- A joint maximization incentive in closed-loop supply chains with competing retailers: the case of spent-battery recycling
- Stable recycling networks under the extended producer responsibility
- Should a retailer bargain over a wholesale price with a manufacturer using a dual-channel supply chain?
- The more supply chain control power, the better? A comparison among four kinds of cooperation models
- Group bargaining in supply chains
- Decision-making of a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain in the context government policy: a dynamic game theory
- Supplier encroachment under nonlinear pricing with imperfect substitutes: bargaining power versus revenue-sharing
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