Group bargaining in supply chains

DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00244-9zbMath1479.91146OpenAlexW3130890550MaRDI QIDQ2059094

Derek J. Clark, Jean-Christophe Péreau

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00244-9

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingsupply chaincomplementary inputs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
• Stable coalition structures with open membership and asymmetric firms
• Alliance or no alliance -- bargaining power in competing reverse supply chains
• The timing of contracting with externalities
• Optimal formation rules for patent pools
• A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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