Optimal formation rules for patent pools

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0379-ZzbMATH Open1173.91359OpenAlexW2037139629MaRDI QIDQ2391055FDOQ2391055

Authors: Steffen Brenner 

Publication date: 24 July 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0379-z

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zbMATH Keywords

antitrustR\&D cooperationoptimal conditionsendogeneous coalition formationpatent thicket

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
• Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models

Cited In (6)

• Adverse effects of patent pooling on product development and commercialization
• Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation
• Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents
• Group bargaining in supply chains
• Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs
• On the optimal mix of patent instruments

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