Optimal licensing of uncertain patents in the shadow of litigation
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Publication:2345227
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.009zbMath1311.91108OpenAlexW1971060930MaRDI QIDQ2345227
Yassine Lefouili, Rabah Amir, David Encaoua
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.009
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (4)
Optimal licensing contracts with a downstream oligopoly: insider versus outsider innovation ⋮ Revenue royalties ⋮ On the licensing of a technology with unknown use ⋮ Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
Cites Work
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- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
- On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets
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