Don't ask, don't tell: sharing revenues with a dishonest retailer

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2015.07.054zbMath1346.90031OpenAlexW1070010470WikidataQ57433502 ScholiaQ57433502MaRDI QIDQ320728

Mohammad Hasan, M. Dambrine

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.07.054

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationsupply chain managementinformation sharingdishonestyrevenue-sharing contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Economics of information (91B44) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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