Don't ask, don't tell: sharing revenues with a dishonest retailer
From MaRDI portal
Publication:320728
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2015.07.054zbMATH Open1346.90031OpenAlexW1070010470WikidataQ57433502 ScholiaQ57433502MaRDI QIDQ320728FDOQ320728
Authors: H. Sebastian Heese, Eda Kemahlıoğlu-Ziya 
Publication date: 7 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.07.054
Recommendations
- When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer?
- Confidentiality and information sharing in supply chain coordination
- Strategic information sharing in a supply chain
- Untruthful probabilistic demand forecasts in vendor-managed revenue-sharing contracts: Coordinating the chain
- Strategic information sharing in online retailing under a consignment contract with revenue sharing
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects
- The allocation of inventory risk in a supply chain: push, pull, and advance-purchase discount contracts
- Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations
- Supply chain inventory management and the value of shared information
- Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain
- The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain
- Contracting with asymmetric demand information in supply chains
- A supplier's optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information
- Supplier-buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation
- Value of information in capacitated supply chains
- Strategic information management under leakage in a supply chain
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Some two-echelon style-goods inventory models with asymmetric market information
- Option and forward contracting with asymmetric information: Valuation issues in supply chains
- A distributed coordination mechanism for supply networks with asymmetric information
- Commitment-penalty contracts in drop-shipping supply chains with asymmetric demand information
- The effect of collaborative forecasting on supply chain performance
- A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem
- Purchasing under asymmetric demand and cost information: when is more private information better?
- Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Untruthful probabilistic demand forecasts in vendor-managed revenue-sharing contracts: Coordinating the chain
- Channel incentives in sharing new product demand information and robust contracts
Cited In (14)
- Stochastic behavior of exchange rate on an international supply chain under random energy price
- Internal and external reference effects in a two-tier supply chain
- Percentage rent contracts between co-stores
- A revised sales rebate contract with effort‐dependent demand: a channel coordination approach
- Revenue-sharing between developers of virtual products and platform distributors
- Retailers' endogenous sequencing game and information acquisition game in the presence of information leakage
- Asymmetric retailers with different moving sequences: group buying vs. individual purchasing
- Untruthful probabilistic demand forecasts in vendor-managed revenue-sharing contracts: Coordinating the chain
- When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer?
- Contract design when quality is co-created in a supply chain
- Supply chain forecasting when information is not shared
- Financing and operating strategies for blockchain technology-driven accounts receivable chains
- Overstated product sustainability: real cases and a game-theoretical analysis
- Supplier encroachment under nonlinear pricing with imperfect substitutes: bargaining power versus revenue-sharing
This page was built for publication: Don't ask, don't tell: sharing revenues with a dishonest retailer
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q320728)
