Purchasing Under Asymmetric Demand and Cost Information: When Is More Private Information Better?
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Publication:3225920
DOI10.1287/opre.1110.0928zbMath1233.91130OpenAlexW2031831365MaRDI QIDQ3225920
Izak Duenyas, Dimitris Kostamis
Publication date: 26 March 2012
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0928
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
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Don't ask, don't tell: sharing revenues with a dishonest retailer ⋮ Supply-chain performance anomalies: fairness concerns under private cost information ⋮ Green channel coordination under asymmetric information ⋮ Demand information acquisition strategy in a dual channel supply chain ⋮ Information sharing for competing supply chains with demand disruption ⋮ Designing multi-period supply contracts in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information ⋮ On the interaction between asymmetric demand signal and forecast accuracy information
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