A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict: The genesis of bargaining power

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9093-8zbMath1178.91070MaRDI QIDQ1025634

József Sákovics, Joan Maria Esteban

Publication date: 19 June 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9093-8

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining; conflict; non-cooperative game; agreement in the shadow of conflict; disagreement function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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