A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict: The genesis of bargaining power
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Publication:1025634
DOI10.1007/S11238-007-9093-8zbMath1178.91070OpenAlexW2096703857MaRDI QIDQ1025634
József Sákovics, Joan Maria Esteban
Publication date: 19 June 2009
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9093-8
Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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