The computation of the Nash bargaining solution

DOI10.1016/0898-1221(89)90136-3MaRDI QIDQ1264100zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors K. Appert

Publication date 1989

Published in Computers & Mathematics with Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0898-1221(89)90136-3

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative Nash bargaining solutionfeasible direction methodHilbert spacen-player decision problemnoncooperative Nash outcometwo-level hierarchical decision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

An n-player decision problem is described by the decision set \(\Omega_ i\) and the objective functional \(J_ i:\) \(\Omega\) \(\to {\mathbb{R}}\) for any decision maker i, \(1\leq i\leq n\). Here \(\Omega =\Omega_ 1\times \Omega_ 2\times...\times \Omega_ n\) and further, let \((D_ 1,D_ 2,...,D_ n)\in {\mathbb{R}}^ n\) be the noncooperative Nash outcome where \(D_ i\in {\mathbb{R}}\) represents a status quo outcome for decision maker i. The element \(u^*\in \Omega\) is called the cooperative Nash bargaining solution for the n-player decision problem if it is a solution to the problem \[ \max imize\quad \prod^{n}_{i=1}(J_ i(u)-D_ i) \] subject to \(u\in \Omega\) and \(J_ i(u)\geq D_ i\) for all \(1\leq i\leq n\). The authors present two methods to compute the Nash bargaining solution. Firstly, the Nash bargaining problem is considered as a product-form optimization problem in a Hilbert space with functional inequality constraints and the feasible direction method is applied to find its solution. Secondly, the Nash bargaining problem is considered as a hierarchical decision problem and it is solved by an indirect hierarchical method of finding bargaining solutions. Under certain conditions, the Nash bargaining problem is equivalent to a two-level hierarchical decision problem. At the lower level of the hierarchy a weighted sum of the decision makers' objectives is maximized. At the top level a set of nonlinear algebraic equations is iteratively solved to obtain the Nash bargaining solution. The computation of the Nash bargaining solution in both methods is carried out by means of an algorithm.

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Cites work

• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• Constrained optimization methods in Hilbert spaces and their applications to optimal control problems with functional inequality constraints
• Nondominated decisions and cone convexity in dynamic multicriteria decision problems
• Rate of Convergence of a Class of Methods of Feasible Directions
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Cited in

(19)

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• Adjustment process-based approach for computing a Nash-Cournot equilibrium
• The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems
• On the relation between the Nash bargaining solution and the weighting method
• Collusive game solutions via optimization
• Combinatorial structures of max-type functions characterizing the optimal solution of the equivalence problem
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