Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.06.003MaRDI QIDQ860348zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Garance Genicot, Debraj Ray

Publication date 9 January 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4506439000000000235.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

delaysexploitationcoordination gamebilateral contractingmultilateral externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Contracting with Externalities
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Cites work

• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Contracting with Externalities
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
• Perfect competition, the profit criterion, and the organization of economic activity

Cited in

(20)

• Contracting with externalities and outside options
• Satisficing contracts
• Optimal nonlinear pricing in social networks under asymmetric network information
• On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
• Coercion, contract and the limits of the market
• Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
• Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• Partially cooperative games
• Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales
• Breakdown in multilateral negotiations
• Collective hold‐up
• Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences
• Breach of Contract
• The timing of contracting with externalities
• Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure
• Group targeting under networked synergies
• The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining
• Contracting with Externalities
• Sequential vote buying

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