Sequential contracting with multiple principals
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Dynamic common agency.
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- On the use of menus in sequential common agency
- Oversight of Long-Term Investment by Short-Lived Regulators
- Real Analysis and Probability
- Special Interests and Technological Change
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
Cited in
(11)- Sequential Bayesian persuasion
- On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
- Contractible contracts in common agency problems
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- Slow persuasion
- Decentralization of contracts with interim side-contracting
- Multi-contracting mechanism design
- On the use of menus in sequential common agency
- Reciprocal contracting
- Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand
- Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences
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