Sequential Bayesian persuasion

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105763OpenAlexW4388767338MaRDI QIDQ6139982

Wenhao Wu

Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105763

zbMATH Keywords

communicationperfect Bayesian equilibriummultiple sendersBayesian persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Sequential Information Design
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• BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
• Long Cheap Talk
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• State Constraints in Convex Control Problems of Bolza
• Long information design

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