Sequential Bayesian persuasion
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Publication:6139982
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Cites work
- A model of expertise
- BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Competition in persuasion
- Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
- Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
- Long Cheap Talk
- Long information design
- Long persuasion games
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Optimal dynamic information provision
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- Sequential Information Design
- Sequential contracting with multiple principals
- Sequential persuasion
- State Constraints in Convex Control Problems of Bolza
- Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games
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