Sequential Bayesian persuasion

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105763OpenAlexW4388767338MaRDI QIDQ6139982FDOQ6139982

Wenhao Wu

Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105763

zbMATH Keywords

communicationmultiple sendersBayesian persuasionperfect Bayesian equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• A model of expertise
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Long Cheap Talk
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• State Constraints in Convex Control Problems of Bolza
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Long persuasion games
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• Competition in Persuasion
• Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Sequential Information Design
• Optimal dynamic information provision
• Sequential persuasion
• Long information design

Cited In (1)

• Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion

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