Private Bayesian persuasion

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.008zbMath1410.91324OpenAlexW3123076852WikidataQ128021601 ScholiaQ128021601MaRDI QIDQ2419595

Yakov Babichenko, Itai Arieli

Publication date: 14 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.008

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionsubmodular utilitysupermodular utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion. ⋮ The secretary recommendation problem ⋮ Public Bayesian persuasion: being almost optimal and almost persuasive ⋮ Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores ⋮ Feasible joint posterior beliefs with binary signals ⋮ Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models ⋮ Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations ⋮ A population's feasible posterior beliefs ⋮ Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective ⋮ When (not) to publicize inspection results ⋮ Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ On the hardness of designing public signals ⋮ Persuasion under costly learning ⋮ Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment ⋮ Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality ⋮ Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication

Cites Work

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