The secretary recommendation problem

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.002zbMath1497.91090arXiv1907.04252OpenAlexW2957684685MaRDI QIDQ2155898

Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky, Niklas Hahn

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.04252

zbMATH Keywords

online algorithmsapproximation algorithmssecretary problemBayesian persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Increasing revenue in Bayesian posted price auctions through signaling, Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication

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