scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100
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Publication:3767079
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(49)- Delegated portfolio management
- Posterior-preserving information improvements and principal-agent relationships
- Delegation and the regulation of risk
- Decentralization and collusion
- Decentralized decision-making in a large team with local information.
- Should purchasing activities be outsourced along with production?
- Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
- Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
- Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse
- Designing communication hierarchies
- Incomplete contracts versus communication
- Divide and conquer: the engineering of delegation
- The secretary recommendation problem
- Money burning in the theory of delegation
- (Not) delegating decisions to experts: the effect of uncertainty
- Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
- Transfer of authority within hierarchies
- Flexible contracts
- Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
- Optimal limited authority for principal
- Communication in bargaining over decision rights
- Optimal contingent delegation
- Optimal sequential delegation
- Decentralized decision making in dynamic technological systems
- Allocation of Decision-making Authority
- Delegating decisions in strategic settings
- Monitoring gains and decentralization
- Eliciting information from a committee
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions
- A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
- The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7640913 (Why is no real title available?)
- Delegating learning
- Deontic Logic in Computer Science
- Allocating losses: bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation
- When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
- Regret-minimizing project choice
- Delegated online search
- Optimal estimation when researcher and social preferences are misaligned
- Persuasion meets delegation
- Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate
- Delegated contracting, wage compression, and quiet quitting
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- Authority and communication in the laboratory
- Repeated delegation
- Awareness and control decentralization: stochastic case
- Veto-based delegation
- Informational control and organizational design
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