scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0614.00032.] This chapter concerns decentralized decision-making in a nonmarket organization. A principal has to make a decision under uncertainty. He has available agents whom he may consult in the process of making the decision, because the agents possess some relevant information. The problem the principal faces in using agents is that the agents may have different objectives than he has. I am interested in the principal's problem of designing a decision mechanism, which optimally exploits the agents' cooperation. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a quite general formulation of the decentralization problem, which specializes to delegation when different agents' information do not get coodinated in the decision process. The delegation problem is reformulated in section 3. A theorem on the existence of optimal control sets is proved and examples are presented to indicate the general applicability of delegation. Section 4 treats the earlier mentioned extension of Weitzman's planning problem and section 5 contains the general results on the use of interval controls. The value of delegation is studied in section 6 and conclusions with a comparison to some of the literature are contained in section 7.
- Delegated portfolio management
- Posterior-preserving information improvements and principal-agent relationships
- Delegation and the regulation of risk
- Decentralization and collusion
- Decentralized decision-making in a large team with local information.
- Should purchasing activities be outsourced along with production?
- Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
- Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
- Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse
- Designing communication hierarchies
- Incomplete contracts versus communication
- Divide and conquer: the engineering of delegation
- The secretary recommendation problem
- Money burning in the theory of delegation
- (Not) delegating decisions to experts: the effect of uncertainty
- Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
- Transfer of authority within hierarchies
- Flexible contracts
- Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
- Optimal limited authority for principal
- Communication in bargaining over decision rights
- Optimal contingent delegation
- Optimal sequential delegation
- Decentralized decision making in dynamic technological systems
- Allocation of Decision-making Authority
- Delegating decisions in strategic settings
- Monitoring gains and decentralization
- Eliciting information from a committee
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions
- A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
- The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7640913 (Why is no real title available?)
- Delegating learning
- Deontic Logic in Computer Science
- Allocating losses: bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation
- When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
- Regret-minimizing project choice
- Delegated online search
- Optimal estimation when researcher and social preferences are misaligned
- Persuasion meets delegation
- Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate
- Delegated contracting, wage compression, and quiet quitting
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- Authority and communication in the laboratory
- Repeated delegation
- Awareness and control decentralization: stochastic case
- Veto-based delegation
- Informational control and organizational design
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