scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100

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[For the entire collection see Zbl 0614.00032.] This chapter concerns decentralized decision-making in a nonmarket organization. A principal has to make a decision under uncertainty. He has available agents whom he may consult in the process of making the decision, because the agents possess some relevant information. The problem the principal faces in using agents is that the agents may have different objectives than he has. I am interested in the principal's problem of designing a decision mechanism, which optimally exploits the agents' cooperation. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a quite general formulation of the decentralization problem, which specializes to delegation when different agents' information do not get coodinated in the decision process. The delegation problem is reformulated in section 3. A theorem on the existence of optimal control sets is proved and examples are presented to indicate the general applicability of delegation. Section 4 treats the earlier mentioned extension of Weitzman's planning problem and section 5 contains the general results on the use of interval controls. The value of delegation is studied in section 6 and conclusions with a comparison to some of the literature are contained in section 7.




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