Optimal limited authority for principal
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Publication:2434229
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.014zbMath1284.91324MaRDI QIDQ2434229
Publication date: 5 February 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.014
Related Items
Optimal sequential delegation, Optimal delay in committees, Incomplete contracts versus communication, Transfer of authority within hierarchies, Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary
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