Communication in bargaining over decision rights
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Publication:2442848
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.002zbMath1290.91068OpenAlexW2114361009MaRDI QIDQ2442848
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.002
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items
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