Communication in bargaining over decision rights

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.02.002MaRDI QIDQ2442848zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wooyoung Lim

Publication date 1 April 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkdecision rightsdelegationmonetary transfer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100 (Why is no real title available?)
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Delegation
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Support restrictions and sequential equilibria
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• The impact of reelection pressures on the fulfillment of campaign promises
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game

Cited in

(3)

• Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent
• Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
• Communication and bargaining in the spatial model

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