Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0395-ZMaRDI QIDQ836879zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Helmut Bester

Publication date 9 September 2009

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13481/

zbMATH Keywords

externalitiesimperfect informationtheory of the firmincomplete contractsauthoritydecision rights

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship
• A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
• Corporate governance
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Incentives in Teams
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility

Cited in

(6)

• Communication in bargaining over decision rights
• Optimal sequential delegation
• Authority and incentives in organizations
• Governing Adaptation¹
• The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights
• Allocation of Decision-making Authority

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