Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship
- A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
- Corporate governance
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Incentives in Teams
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategic Information Transmission
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
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