When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105676MaRDI QIDQ6175529zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 18 August 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105676

zbMATH Keywords

conditional delegationdynamic communicationfrequency of reportmultidimensional disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
• Comparative cheap talk
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100 (Why is no real title available?)
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Optimal Delegation
• Repeated delegation
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic communication with minimal verification
• When to drop a bombshell

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