When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105676zbMath1521.91040OpenAlexW4379107760MaRDI QIDQ6175529

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Publication date: 18 August 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105676

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic communicationconditional delegationfrequency of reportmultidimensional disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

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• Strategic Communication With Minimal Verification
• Optimal Delegation
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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