Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
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Publication:4895052
DOI10.2307/2171850zbMath0856.90137MaRDI QIDQ4895052
Publication date: 23 February 1997
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171850
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