Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games

DOI10.2307/2171850zbMATH Open0856.90137OpenAlexW2007567574MaRDI QIDQ4895052FDOQ4895052

Alejandro M. Manelli

Publication date: 23 February 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171850

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zbMATH Keywords

cheap talksequential equilibriainfinite signaling gamesinfinite action-games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (22)

• Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
• Balance and discontinuities in infinite games with type-dependent strategies
• Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies
• A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
• Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
• On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval
• Perception games and privacy
• Signaling Games
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
• When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
• Competition in costly talk
• The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
• Naive audience and communication bias
• Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
• Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
• Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games
• Coordination and weak announcement proofness: Two comments on ``Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
• Sequential decisions under uncertainty and the maximum theorem
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk

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