Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4895052
Recommendations
Cited in
(25)- Signaling games
- Sequential cheap talks
- A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Coordination and weak announcement proofness: Two comments on ``Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
- The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
- Competition in costly talk
- When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
- Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games
- Perception games and privacy
- Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
- Naive audience and communication bias
- On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval
- A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space
- Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games
- The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
- Balance and discontinuities in infinite games with type-dependent strategies
- Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies
- Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
- Sequential decisions under uncertainty and the maximum theorem
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
This page was built for publication: Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4895052)
