A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.08.004zbMATH Open1394.91056OpenAlexW2509361785MaRDI QIDQ324159FDOQ324159

Authors: Alexander Frug 

Publication date: 10 October 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.004

Recommendations

• Cheap talk with an exit option: the case of discrete action space
• Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
• Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication
• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games

zbMATH Keywords

discrete cheap talkpartitional equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Informational control and organizational design
• Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games

Cited In (6)

• Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case
• The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
• Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
• Cheap talk with an exit option: the case of discrete action space

This page was built for publication: A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q324159)