Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games

DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0831-1zbMath1319.91040OpenAlexW2091720882MaRDI QIDQ2343483

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 5 May 2015

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0831-1

zbMATH Keywords

information transmissiondelegationinformed principalnestednesssender-receiver gamesintermediary

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space ⋮ Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest ⋮ Two-sided strategic information transmission ⋮ Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk ⋮ Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games

Cites Work

• Value of public information in sender-receiver games
• Informal communication
• Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• A two-person game of information transmission
• Information transmission when the informed party is confused
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements
• Professional advice
• Aggregating the Single Crossing Property
• Allocation of Decision-making Authority
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Hierarchical cheap talk
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria

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