Information transmission when the informed party is confused

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0010MaRDI QIDQ1913293zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joel Watson

Publication date 22 May 1996

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0010

zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver gamesinformation transmissiontwo-sided incomplete informationfully revealing equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) 2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
• Two-sided strategic information transmission

Cited in

(17)

• Communication in Cournot oligopoly
• Value of public information in sender-receiver games
• Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
• False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
• Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
• Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk
• Screening and signaling in communication
• Professional advice
• Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
• MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
• Perfect robust implementation by private information design
• Sender-receiver games with cooperation
• Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
• Cheap talk with two-sided private information
• The economics of excuses: job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests
• Information transfer with a twist
• Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games

This page was built for publication: Information transmission when the informed party is confused

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1913293)