Professional advice
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Publication:2490126
Recommendations
- A mathematical model of communication with reputational concerns
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Information control in reputational cheap talk
Cites work
- A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions
- A Theory of Credibility
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3938216 (Why is no real title available?)
- Informal communication
- Information transmission when the informed party is confused
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- On the convergence of informational cascades
- Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
- Strategic Information Transmission
Cited in
(47)- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding
- Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
- Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk
- Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game: the case of \(n\geq 4\) firms
- Preselection and expert advice
- Information control in reputational cheap talk
- Learning about analysts
- Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games
- Managerial reputation, risk-taking, and imperfect capital markets
- The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise
- Goodwill in communication
- Starting small to communicate
- Committee, expert advice, and the weighted majority algorithm: an application to the pricing decision of a monopolist
- Hierarchical multistage Gaussian signaling games in noncooperative communication and control systems
- A mathematical model of communication with reputational concerns
- Committees with leaks
- Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games
- Will truth out? -- An advisor's quest to appear competent
- Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired
- Persuasion and learning by countersignaling
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
- On the informational content of advice: a theoretical and experimental study
- When is knowledge acquisition socially beneficial in the Laffont-Tirole regulatory framework?
- Reputational bidding
- Semi-dynamic connectivity in the plane
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- How to use expert advice
- Non-exclusive financial advice
- Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability
- The strategy of experts for repeated predictions
- Signaling games
- Sequential expert advice: superiority of closed-door meetings
- A GOOD ADVISOR
- A must lie situation -- avoiding giving negative feedback
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Strategic disclosure with reputational concerns
- Independent versus collective expertise
- Strategic argumentation
- Taking the road less traveled by: Does conversation eradicate pernicious cascades?
- On the (non-) reliance on algorithms -- a decision-theoretic account
- Talking with an extremist
- Truth-telling in dynamic reputational cheap talk
- Social learning among opinion leaders
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Talking to influence
- Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
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