Professional advice
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Publication:2490126
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.005zbMath1108.91016OpenAlexW4247118268MaRDI QIDQ2490126
Marco Ottaviani, Peter Norman Sørensen
Publication date: 28 April 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://curis.ku.dk/ws/files/248807998/pa.pdf
Related Items (27)
Semi-dynamic Connectivity in the Plane ⋮ Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk ⋮ REPUTATIONAL BIDDING ⋮ Will truth out? -- An advisor's quest to appear competent ⋮ Starting small to communicate ⋮ Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game: the case of \(n\geq 4\) firms ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Preselection and expert advice ⋮ Information control in reputational cheap talk ⋮ Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired ⋮ Dynamic strategic information transmission ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games ⋮ Independent versus collective expertise ⋮ When is knowledge acquisition socially beneficial in the Laffont-Tirole regulatory framework? ⋮ Taking the road less traveled by: Does conversation eradicate pernicious cascades? ⋮ Persuasion and learning by countersignaling ⋮ When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests ⋮ A must lie situation -- avoiding giving negative feedback ⋮ Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns ⋮ Committee, expert advice, and the weighted majority algorithm: an application to the pricing decision of a monopolist ⋮ Hierarchical multistage Gaussian signaling games in noncooperative communication and control systems ⋮ Aggregation of expert opinions ⋮ Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding ⋮ Managerial reputation, risk-taking, and imperfect capital markets ⋮ Committees with leaks ⋮ Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Informal communication
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- On the convergence of informational cascades
- Information transmission when the informed party is confused
- A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions
- A Theory of Credibility
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
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