Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.03.001zbMATH Open1188.91042OpenAlexW3023477050MaRDI QIDQ1036601FDOQ1036601

Alexander Guembel, Silvia Rossetto

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3147/1/guembel_rossetto.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

noisecommunicationcheap talkreputational concerns

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Professional advice

Cited In (3)

• Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
• Cheap talk with coarse understanding
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives

   Recommendations

• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives 👍 👎
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders 👍 👎
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk 👍 👎
• Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources 👍 👎
• Cheap talk with coarse understanding 👍 👎

This page was built for publication: Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1036601)