Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources

DOI10.1007/S00199-018-1123-YMaRDI QIDQ2323299zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Junichiro Ishida, Takashi Shimizu

Publication date 30 August 2019

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1123-y

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkhigher-order uncertaintyinformed receiverstrategic communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding
• Cheap talk with private signal structures

Cites work

• A model of expertise
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
• Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
• Informal communication
• Information transmission when the informed party is confused
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic information transmission networks
• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
• Value of public information in sender-receiver games

Cited in

(9)

• Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding
• Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
• Cheap talk with private signal structures
• Two-sided strategic information transmission
• Cheap talk with coarse understanding
• Probabilistic cheap talk
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
• Communicating in a coordination game with private information

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