Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources

DOI10.1007/s00199-018-1123-yzbMath1422.91130OpenAlexW2799847614MaRDI QIDQ2323299

Junichiro Ishida, Takashi Shimizu

Publication date: 30 August 2019

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1123-y

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkstrategic communicationhigher-order uncertaintyinformed receiver

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Two-sided strategic information transmission

Cites Work

• Strategic information transmission networks
• Value of public information in sender-receiver games
• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
• Informal communication
• Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Information transmission when the informed party is confused
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
• A Model of Expertise
• Strategic Information Transmission

This page was built for publication: Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources