Informal communication

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2003.09.004zbMATH Open1181.91042OpenAlexW4243738808MaRDI QIDQ707291FDOQ707291

Authors: Wojciech Olszewski 

Publication date: 9 February 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.004

Recommendations

• Receiver's dilemma
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Communication with endogenous information acquisition
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Relational communication

zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Credibility
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
• Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Communication between rational agents
• Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
• Credible proposals in communication games
• Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements

Cited In (15)

• Signaling games
• Value of public information in sender-receiver games
• Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
• Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
• Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game
• Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Screening and signaling in communication
• Professional advice
• Pathways of persuasion
• Cheap talk with two-sided private information
• A reputation for honesty
• Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• A must lie situation -- avoiding giving negative feedback

This page was built for publication: Informal communication

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q707291)