Informal communication

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.004zbMath1181.91042OpenAlexW4243738808MaRDI QIDQ707291

Wojciech Olszewski

Publication date: 9 February 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.004

zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (13)

Screening and Signaling in Communication* ⋮ Credulity, lies, and costly talk ⋮ Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ A reputation for honesty ⋮ Value of public information in sender-receiver games ⋮ Pathways of persuasion ⋮ A must lie situation -- avoiding giving negative feedback ⋮ EFFECTIVE PERSUASION ⋮ Professional advice ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources ⋮ Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games

Cites Work

• Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
• Communication between rational agents
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Credible proposals in communication games
• Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
• Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
• A Theory of Credibility
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective

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