Credulity, lies, and costly talk
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2373768
Recommendations
Cites work
- A Theory of Credibility
- An experimental study of strategic information transmission
- Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3292104 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3109695 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
- Informal communication
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Naive audience and communication bias
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
Cited in
(76)- On the danger of half-truths
- How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
- Communication under language barriers
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
- Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge
- Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
- Creating confusion
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- Level-k reasoning in school choice
- Rollover risk and stress test credibility
- Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
- Communication-enhancing vagueness
- When does centralization undermine adaptation?
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
- Promises and endogenous reneging costs
- Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation
- Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- Maximal miscommunication
- Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
- Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
- Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
- Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication
- Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
- Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies
- Persuasion with communication costs
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- De-biasing strategic communication
- A reputation for honesty
- Communication with endogenous deception costs
- Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- COSTLY EVIDENCE AND SYSTEMS OF FACT-FINDING
- The Market for Quacks
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Strategic information transmission networks
- Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1745558 (Why is no real title available?)
- Lying, accuracy and credence
- Cheap talk and editorial control
- Implementation with evidence
- Dynamics of lying
- Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
- Learning Manipulation Through Information Dissemination
- Signaling games
- Communication with forgetful liars
- The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
- Propaganda and credulity
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Pervasive signaling
- Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
- Influential news and policy-making
- GAMING A SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM
- Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games
- Competition in costly talk
- Optimal overconfidence in the presence of information manipulation
- Lying for votes
- Repeated communication with private lying costs
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Strategic argumentation
- Communication and coordination with constraints
- Information manipulation and majority rule
- Meaning in communication games
- Competitive capture of public opinion
- Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
- Evidence games: lying aversion and commitment
- On the impact of information manipulation in democratic elections
- Cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer
- Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness
- Strategic Opinion Manipulation in Multiplex Networks
- Information identification in different networks with heterogeneous information sources
- Naive audience and communication bias
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Intentional vagueness
This page was built for publication: Credulity, lies, and costly talk
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2373768)
