Credulity, lies, and costly talk

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.003zbMath1156.91322OpenAlexW3122778752MaRDI QIDQ2373768

Francesco Squintani, Navin Kartik, Marco Ottaviani

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

signaling cheap talk lying deception naive receivers full revelation inflated communication misreporting costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (59)

Learning Manipulation Through Information Dissemination ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest ⋮ Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication ⋮ Naive audience and communication bias ⋮ Promises and endogenous reneging costs ⋮ Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ De-biasing strategic communication ⋮ Cheap Talk and Editorial Control ⋮ A reputation for honesty ⋮ Pervasive signaling ⋮ Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers ⋮ Dynamic strategic information transmission ⋮ Influential news and policy-making ⋮ GAMING A SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM ⋮ Strategic information transmission networks ⋮ Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications ⋮ Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market ⋮ Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games ⋮ Competition in costly talk ⋮ Optimal overconfidence in the presence of information manipulation ⋮ How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information? ⋮ Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission ⋮ Lying for votes ⋮ Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences ⋮ Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations ⋮ Repeated communication with private lying costs ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Strategic argumentation ⋮ Intentional vagueness ⋮ Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies ⋮ Communication under language barriers ⋮ Dynamics of lying ⋮ Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty ⋮ Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response ⋮ Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge ⋮ The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Creating confusion ⋮ Propaganda and credulity ⋮ Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers ⋮ Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with costly messages ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Level-k reasoning in school choice ⋮ Persuasion with communication costs ⋮ Mechanism design with partial state verifiability ⋮ Information identification in different networks with heterogeneous information sources ⋮ Rollover risk and stress test credibility ⋮ Maximal miscommunication ⋮ Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions ⋮ Simple versus rich language in disclosure games ⋮ Communication-enhancing vagueness ⋮ When does centralization undermine adaptation? ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions ⋮ Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games ⋮ Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games

Cites Work

This page was built for publication: Credulity, lies, and costly talk