Credulity, lies, and costly talk

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.003zbMath1156.91322MaRDI QIDQ2373768

Francesco Squintani, Navin Kartik, Marco Ottaviani

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

signaling; cheap talk; lying; deception; naive receivers; full revelation; inflated communication; misreporting costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

Related Items

Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers, Strategic argumentation, Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness, Naive audience and communication bias, Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission, Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case, Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication, Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations, Mechanism design with partial state verifiability

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