Naive audience and communication bias
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Publication:863401
DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0054-1zbMath1118.91027OpenAlexW2108631112MaRDI QIDQ863401
Marco Ottaviani, Francesco Squintani
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0054-1
Related Items (22)
Screening and Signaling in Communication* ⋮ Credulity, lies, and costly talk ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest ⋮ Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk ⋮ De-biasing strategic communication ⋮ Cheap Talk and Editorial Control ⋮ Influential news and policy-making ⋮ Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games ⋮ Competition in costly talk ⋮ Misperception and cognition in markets ⋮ Communication with endogenous deception costs ⋮ Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission ⋮ Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Propaganda and credulity ⋮ Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers ⋮ Informational control and organizational design ⋮ Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Simple versus rich language in disclosure games ⋮ Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
Cites Work
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- An experimental study of strategic information transmission
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- A Theory of Credibility
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
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