Naive audience and communication bias
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Publication:863401
DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0054-1zbMATH Open1118.91027OpenAlexW2108631112MaRDI QIDQ863401FDOQ863401
Authors: Marco Ottaviani, Francesco Squintani 
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0054-1
Recommendations
Cites Work
- An experimental study of strategic information transmission
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- A Theory of Credibility
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
- Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
Cited In (24)
- Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
- Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences
- Misperception and cognition in markets
- Communication with endogenous deception costs
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- Informational control and organizational design
- Influential news and policy-making
- Competition in costly talk
- Screening and signaling in communication
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Communication between unbiased agents
- Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games
- De-biasing strategic communication
- Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
- Cheap talk and editorial control
- Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
- Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
- Communication and coordination with constraints
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
- Propaganda and credulity
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